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  In  this  paper we have  examined the  performance of 
     Mastershares, the first all equity close ended growth 
  fund established by the Unit Trust of India (UTI) in 
     the country, using the various portfolio performance 
  measures that have been suggested in the literature.  
  We found that while in terms of return on the Net Asset 
  Value (NAV) the fund has out-performed the market, in  
     terms of returns based on Market Prices it has shown a 
     mixed performance. On further investigation, we inferred 
     that the excellent performance in terms of NAV could neither 
  be ascribed to selectivity nor to timing of decisions.  
     The explanation possibly lies in UTI's acquisition of  
  stocks in the primary market at well below prevailing   
     market prices and in the manner of allocation of stocks  
     to various funds managed by the Trust. Our analysis also 
     revealed that the market quite irrationally inflates the 
     volatility of the market price of Mastershares as compared 
     to the volatility observed in the NAV. This observation      
     which implies market inefficiency is in line with the  







  Mastershares  is  the  first  close  ended  Mutual  Fund  in  the 
Indian capital market. It was launched by the Unit Trust of India 
(UTI) in September 1986. Though the initial plan was to limit the 
size  of  the  fund  to  Rs.  50  crores,  since  the  issue  was 
oversubscribed,  UTI  decided  to  retain  the  entire  amount  of  Rs. 
150.43  crores  collected  from  the  market.  Subsequently,  in  March 
'89,  another  Rs.  82.84  crores  were  added  to  the  fund  through  a 
rights issue at a premium of Rs. 2. The total corpus as of today 
therefore is Rs. 233.27 crores. 
 
  Since Mastershares was conceived as a growth fund, the major 2  2 
portion  of  benefit  was  expected  to  be  in  the  form  of  capital 
gains. Therefore, the fund has almost exclusively been invested in 
equity. The letter of offer for the rights issue in 1989 mentioned 
that  the  entire  capital  of  the  fund  was  invested  in  a  basket  of 
112  growth  oriented  shares  from  17  industries.  The  annual  report 
of  UTI  for  1989  also  stated  that  the  Fund  was  invested  in  a 
portfolio  of  137  scrips  in  18  industries.  More  recently,  in  an 
interview  published  in  August  1-14,  '90  issue  of  Business  World, 
Mr. K.N.Atmaramani, General Manager (Finance & Investment) of UTI 
said that about 93% of the Fund was deployed in equity. Thus, it 
is clear that since inception, a large part of the Fund has always 
been invested in equity. 
 
  The  redemption  of  Mastershares  would  commence  at  the 
discretion  of  the  fund  after  19th  October  1993,  that  is,  seven 
years  after  the  issue,  on  terms  specified  by  the  UTI.  The 
redemption  price  would  be  based  on  the  Net  Asset  Value  (NAV) 
arrived  at  by  dividing  the  market  value  of  the  fund,  net  of 
provisions  to  be  made  for  costs  of  winding  up  the  fund,  by  the 
number of mastershares outstanding. In the intervening period, to 
ensure  liquidity,  the  Mastershares  have  been  listed  in  all  the 
leading stock exchanges in the country. The UTI also computes and 
announces the NAV of the Mastershares periodically, generally once 
a  week.  The  time  lag  between  the  date  of  computation  of  NAV  and 
the date of announcement of new NAV varies from 2 to 7 days.  
 
  The  UTI  had  made  it  clear  at  the  time  of  issue  that  there 
would  be  no  obligation  to  distribute  any  fixed  percentage  of 
income, since the primary purpose was to provide growth. However, 
the dividend distribution on Mastershares has been quite good. 
 
 
The Market and Mastershares   
 
  Since Mastershares was the first close ended all equity fund, 
the UTI was from the very beginning very keen to ensure that the 
fund  showed  excellent  results.  The  then  Chairman  of  UTI,  Mr. 
Pherwani, stated that the fund would outperform the market through 
judicious  construction  of  a  well  diversified  portfolio.  Even  at 
that  time,  academics  were  skeptical  about  such  an  assertion  [1] 
based  on  the  evidence  in  western  capital  markets  where  Mutual 
Funds have not outperformed the market. 
 
  How  have  Mastershares  fared  in  the  market?  The  mastershares 
have almost always quoted below their NAV. In the first two years, 
till  about  middle  of  1988,  the  market  price  was  about  25%  below 
the NAV. Since then however the spread has been reducing, possibly 3  3 
because  of  the  sea  change  in  the  equity  market.  In  fact,  for  a 
brief  period  in  August/September  '90,  the  price  crossed  the  NAV. 
In the last few months the discount has been about 6%. Today, in 
fact, Mastershares are  fancied by investors. 
 
  There is prima facie every indication that Mastershares have 
been quite successful. In this paper, we would examine rigorously 
whether  the  Mastershares  have  indeed  outperformed  the  market, 
after taking into account the riskiness of the fund's portfolio.  
If we conclude that they have, then we would further investigate  
to  unravel  as  to  how  they  could  do  so.  Was  it  through  superior 
information about scrips? Was it through superior analysis,  
leading to appropriate timing of portfolio revisions?  The period 
of analysis is from July '87 to September '90, as the UTI started 
computing  and  announcing  the  NAVs  of  Mastershares  periodically 
from June 1987 onwards.  
 
Methodology for Evaluating Performance  
 
   The  approach  used  for  examining  the  performance  of 
Mastershares  is  based  on  the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM), 
proposed and developed by Sharpe [2], Lintner [3] and Mossin [4]. 
The model specifies that in equilibrium, the return on a security 
(or a portfolio of securities) would be given by : 
 
      ri    =   rf +  ß (rm - rf)               ...    ...   (0) 
 
where ri   is expected return on security (or portfolio) i 
      rm   is expected market return  
   rf   is the risk-free return 
   ß    is the measure of systematic risk of the security  
           or portfolio 
 
  The estimable form of CAPM is known as the Market Model which 
is specified as follows : 
 
      rt    =   ￿ +  ß rm,t + et                 ...    ...  (1) 
 
where rt   is the return in period t 
      rm,t is the market return in period t 
   et   is the error term 
   ￿    is the constant term which depends on rf and ß 
 
  We used the All Industries All India Equity Index computed by 
Economic Times (ET Index) as the Market Index.  The performance of 4  4 
Mastershares based on NAV and on market price has been evaluated 
separately.    The  ET  index,  the  NAV  and  the  market  price  of 
Mastershares were collected for all the dates as on which the UTI 
computed the NAVs (hereafter called the computation dates). 
 
  We  used  daily  returns  to  estimate  the  coefficients  in  (1). 
The  returns  were  computed  assuming  continuous  compounding.  Since 
the number of days between two successive computation dates varied 
considerably,  the  daily  equivalent  returns  for  each  period  were 
computed as follows : 
 
  rNAV,t    =  1/T [ln(NAVt/NAVt-1)]          ...    ...  (2) 
  rMP,t     =  1/T [ln(MPt/MPt-1)]            ...    ...  (3) 
  rm,t      =  1/T [ln(It/It-1)]              ...    ...  (4) 
where T    is the length of period t in days 
      NAVt is the NAV at the end of period t 
      MPt  is the market price at the end of period t 
      It   is the ET Index at the end of period t 
 
 
Regression Results : NAV 
 
  We regressed the return on NAV against the return on the ET 
Index for the period July 1987 to September 1990, and obtained the 
following result : 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿  Time period  ￿No. of       ￿   ￿*     ￿  ß*   ￿   R2    ￿ 
￿                 ￿observations ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿    Jul87-Sep90  ￿    167      ￿ 0.000796 ￿ 0.832 ￿  0.755  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿  (5.5)   ￿ (22.5)￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  
* The t-values are in the parentheses 
 
  To  investigate  whether  the  coefficients  changed  over  time, 
the coefficients were estimated for six month time spans (the last 
time span was nine months). We observed that the estimated value 
of  ß  was  distinctly  smaller  for  the  first  one  year  (July  '87  to 
June  '88)  as  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  period.  Therefore,  we 
divided  the  time  span  into  two  segments  and  the  two  sets  of 




￿  Time period  ￿No. of       ￿   ￿*     ￿  ß*   ￿   R2    ￿ 
￿                 ￿observations ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿  Jul87-Jun88  ￿     52      ￿ 0.000716 ￿ 0.482 ￿  0.724  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿  (4.06)  ￿ (11.5)￿         ￿ 
￿    Jul88-Sep90  ￿    115      ￿ 0.000620 ￿ 1.044 ￿  0.852  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿  (4.00)  ￿ (25.5)￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
* The t-values are in the parentheses 
 
  The coefficients were different from zero at very high level 
of significance. As stated by UTI Executives on several occasions 
in the last three years the entire corpus of Mastershares funds is 
invested  in  a  very  well  diversified  portfolio  of  stocks. 
Therefore, a priori, one would expect the beta coefficient to be 1 
and  the  performance  no  different  from  the  performance  of  the 
market. While the estimated value of beta is as expected, the  
estimated  value  of  _  points  to  returns  well  above  the  market 
returns. This will be discussed later. 
Regression Results : Market Prices 
 
  We  expected  to  get  results  similar  to  those  obtained  using 
NAVs. However, we were in for a surprise. The ß coefficient for  
returns based on market prices turned out to be much higher than 
that for NAV returns. 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿  Time period  ￿No. of       ￿   ￿*     ￿  ß*   ￿   R2    ￿ 
￿                 ￿observations ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿    Jul87-Sep90  ￿    154      ￿ 0.000357 ￿ 1.121 ￿  0.330  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿  (0.72)  ￿ (8.65)￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  
* The t-values are in the parentheses 
 
  As in case of NAV, we broke up the time span into six month 
periods  to  investigate  variations  in  the  estimates  of  the 
coefficients.  The  ß  coefficient  estimates  varied  significantly 




￿  Time period  ￿No. of       ￿   ￿*     ￿  ß*   ￿   R2    ￿ 
￿                 ￿observations ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿          ￿       ￿         ￿ 
￿  Jul87-Dec87  ￿     20      ￿-0.000240 ￿ 0.260 ￿  0.047  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (-0.26)  ￿ (0.94)￿         ￿ 
￿  Jan88-Jun88  ￿     27      ￿ 0.000841 ￿ 0.750 ￿  0.290  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (0.92)   ￿ (3.19)￿         ￿ 
￿    Jul88-Dec88  ￿     21      ￿-0.000383 ￿ 1.837 ￿  0.364  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (-0.18)  ￿ (3.29)￿         ￿ 
￿    Jan89-Jun89  ￿     28      ￿ 0.000035 ￿ 0.860 ￿  0.146  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (0.03)   ￿ (2.11)￿         ￿ 
￿  Jul89-Dec89  ￿     23      ￿ 0.000231 ￿ 1.075 ￿  0.498  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (0.35)   ￿ (4.56)￿         ￿ 
￿  Jan90-Jun90  ￿     22      ￿ 0.000086 ￿ 0.856 ￿  0.492  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (0.14)   ￿ (4.40)￿         ￿ 
￿  Jul90-Sep90  ￿     13      ￿-0.000685 ￿ 1.776 ￿  0.443  ￿ 
￿                 ￿             ￿ (-0.17)  ￿ (2.96)￿         ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
* The t-values are in the parentheses 
 
  We are unable to explain the large variations in the estimate 
of ß, particularly when the NAV beta after the first year has been 
very close to one (as it is expected to be).  It  
also appears from the results that, in general, in the second half 
of a year, the betas are higher than in the first half. Since beta 
coefficient is a measure of risk of security, it is inexplicable 
as to why in certain periods of time the market would behave as if 
the mastershares were far riskier than the index itself.  
 
 
The Total Portfolio Variance  
 
  Since  Mastershares  has  an  extremely  well  diversified 
portfolio, one can regard it as an efficient portfolio. Therefore, 
one  can  express  the  risk  of  the  Portfolio  as  the  annualized 
standard  deviation  of  return,  known  as  volatility.  The  computed 
returns  and  volatilities  of  NAV,  MP  of  Mastershares  and  the  ET 
Index are as follows : 
 
              NAV    Market price    ET index 
 
Mean return        70.60%        70.60%            41.40%  
Volatility (_)     18.31%        41.31%            19.44% 7  7 
 
  It is quite clear that the risk of Portfolio as measured by 
the volatility of returns is extremely high for the market prices 
of Mastershares particularly when compared with the volatility of 
NAV returns and market returns.   
 
 
Risk Adjusted Performance 
 
  We compared the performance of Mastershares based on Nav and 
market  price  against  the  market  portfolio  represented  by  the  ET 
index  using  the  various  measures  of  performance  which  have  been 
suggested in the literature. 
 
  Treynor  [5]  assumes  that  the  investor  can  eliminate  the 
unsystematic  risk  by  holding  a  diversified  portfolio.  Hence  his 
measure  of  performance  (Tp)  is  the  excess  return  (over  the 
risk-free rate) per unit of systematic risk (beta). 
 
      Tp = (rp - rf)/ßp 
where rp and ßp are the return and beta of the asset. 
 
  Sharpe [6] assumes that the investor invests a large fraction 
of his equity portfolio in the mutual fund and, therefore, cannot 
eliminate  the  unsystematic  risk.    The  Sharpe  measure  of 
performance  (Sp)  is  the  excess  return  per  unit  of  total  risk 
(sigma). 
 
   Sp = (rp - rf)/ ￿p 
where ￿p is the volatility of the asset. 
 
  The Jensen measure of performance [7] is simply the return in 
excess of the equilibrium return mandated by the CAPM.  
 
      Jp = rp - [rf - ßp(rm - rf)] 
where the term within square brackets is the equilibrium return. 
 
  The  Fama  decomposition  [8]  breaks  down  the  observed  return 
into its components : 
 
1. The risk-free rate of return rf 
2. The impact of systematic risk ßp(rm - rf) 
3. The impact of imperfect diversification (￿p/￿m - ßp)(rm - rf) 
4. The net superior returns due to selectivity  
   (rp - rf) - (￿p/￿m) (rm - rf) 8  8 
 
  The computed values of all these performance measures are as 
follows : 
 
                               NAV      MP      Index 
Data 
Sigma(￿p)                     18.31%   41.31%   19.44% 
Return(rp)                    70.60%   70.60%   41.40% 
Beta(ßp)                       0.832    1.121    1.000 
 
Measures 
Treynor                        0.705    0.523    0.294 
Sharpe                         3.201    1.418    1.512 
Jensen                        34.15%   25.65%    0.00% 
Fama 
 Riskfree Return              12.00%   12.00%   12.00% 
 Risk                         24.45%   32.95%   29.40% 
 Diversification               3.23%   29.51%    0.00% 
 Net Selectivity              30.92%   -3.87%    0.00% 
                           --------------------------- 
 Total Return                 70.60%   70.60%   41.40% 
                           =========================== 
 
  If  the  NAV  is  examined,  the  Mastershares  is  found  to 
outperform the market by a significant margin on all measures of 
performance.    The  gain  through  selectivity  is  as  high  as  30.92% 
per annum.   
 
  The performance of Mastershares in terms of market prices is 
much less impressive on all four measures as compared to NAV. This 
is  because  the  market  price  has  a  much  higher  beta  than  the  NAV 
and  also  a  much  higher  total  variance.    This  means  that  whether 
one uses total risk or systematic risk as the measure of risk, the 
market price is more risky than the NAV.  A part of the abnormal 
return  earned  by  Mastershares  is  then  needed  to  compensate  the 
investor for the higher risk.   
 
  In fact, on the basis of total risk Mastershares has not done 
as well as the market.  This is indicated by the Sharpe and Fama 
measures.  However the Treynor and Jensen measures indicate  
that  Mastershares  has  outperformed  the  market  if  only  systematic 
risk is considered. 
 
  The abnormal returns observed in case of NAV of Mastershares 
are not amenable to any easy explanation. Since the portfolio is  
so well diversified, and the beta coefficient is close to 1, the 
portfolio  is  practically  replicating  the  market.  Therefore, 9  9 
selectivity  of  stocks  could  hardly  be  the  reason  for  abnormal 
performance.  
 
  Could timing of transactions explain the results? Given that 
an  institution  like  UTI  cannot  frequently  be  in  and  out  of  the 
market,  without  adverse  price  impact  for  itself,  this  appears 
unlikely.  Nevertheless,  to  explore  the  impact  of  timing,  we 
estimated  abnormal  returns  for  six  months  intervals,  beginning 
July '87. We found that the excess return persists right through. 
As  another  test  of  the  timing  gains,  we  divided  the  period  into 
two  sub-samples.    The  "downswing"  sub-sample  consisted  of  those 
periods  in  which  the  realized  market  return  was  negative.    The 
rest  of  the  sample  consisted  of  the  "upswing"  sub-sample.    The 
timing hypothesis implies that Mastershares has some capability to 
forecast the market return and uses this to move in and out of the 
market reducing its market exposure when the market is expected to 
go  down.    If  this  is  so,  the  beta  of  the  Mastershares  portfolio 
should be lower in the downswing period.  The regression results 
showed that the betas were not significantly different in the two 
sub-samples : the ß for the upswing periods was 0.78 and that for 
the downswing periods was 0.75. This establishes that timing gains 
were not present. 
 
  The  most  plausible  explanation  for  the  abnormal  returns 
therefore appears to be acquisition of shares at well below market 
prices  from  the  primary  market  either  through  direct  allotment 
from a public issue or upon conversion of debt. Another possible 
explanation could be the policy of UTI on allocation of securities 
to various schemes managed by it. 
 
 
Relation between NAV and Market Price 
 
  Since the NAV is computed using the market prices of shares, 
it  represents  the  current  market  value  of  the  portfolio  held  by 
Mastershares.  Unlike the book value for an ordinary company, the 
NAV  can,  with  some  adjustments  for  liquidation  costs  and 
management expenses, be regarded as the "fundamental value" of the 
Mastershares.  Hence, one would expect the market price to move in 
tandem with this fundamental value.  It is difficult to test this 
hypothesis directly as the NAV is published only at  
weekly  intervals,  and  even  on  the  date  of  publication  is  a  few 
days  old.  The  market  would  use  the  latest  published  NAV  to 
estimate  the  current  NAV  and  price  the  Mastershares  accordingly. 
When  a  new  NAV  is  announced,  the  market  price  would  be  affected 
only if the announced NAV diverges from the previous estimate. In 
other words, the market price would respond only to unanticipated 10  10 
changes in NAV. 
 
  To  estimate  the  current  NAV  using  the  latest  available  NAV, 
we use the market model (1). We compute the return earned on the  
market  (ET)  index  from  the  date  of  the  last  NAV  to  the  current 
date.  The  market  model  then  gives  the  expected  return  on  NAV 
during  the  same  period.  This  estimate  of  the  return  is  then 
converted into an estimate of the current NAV.  When a new NAV is 
announced,  the  current  NAV  is  re-estimated  using  the  new  value. 
The change in the estimate of NAV due to this new value is defined 
as the unexpected change in NAV. 
 
    NAVu  =   NAVe - NAV                     ...     ...   (5)  
where  NAVu  is the unexpected change in NAV 
    NAVe  is the estimated value of NAV using the model (1)    
             and estimates for the period July 88 - Sept. 90 
       NAV   is the net asset value announced by UTI 
 
  The  impact  on  market  prices  would  take  place  on  the  first 
trading  day  on  which  the  new  NAV  was  publicly  available.    To 
estimate  this  impact,  we  again  need  to  account  for  the  market 
factor.    Even  in  the  absence  of  any  fresh  information  about 
Mastershares,  the  price  of  the  Mastershares  would  change  in 
conformity with the change in the market index.  We first estimate 
the  market  model  relating  returns  on  Mastershares  prices  to 
returns on the market index.  For this purpose, the price series 
used  was  the  prices  on  the  computation  days.    We  use  the  above 
market model and the actual return on the market index to estimate 
the expected return on the Mastershares prices on the announcement 
day.  This expected return is converted into an expected price of 
the Mastershares; this is the price that should have prevailed in 
the  absence  of  any  specific  information  about  Mastershares.    The 
difference between this price and the actual price is defined as 
the abnormal change in price, and is attributable to the impact of 
fresh information. 
 
   MPu   =   MPe  -  MP                      ...     ...   (6) 
  
where  MPu  is the unexpected change in market price (MP) 
    MPe  is the estimated value of MP using the market model 
            and estimates for the period July 88 - Sept. 90 
 
  The  hypothesis  then  is  that  the  unanticipated  change  in  NAV 
is an important variable explaining the abnormal change in price  
on  the  announcement  day.    The  resulting  regression  specification 
would be : 11  11 
 
    MPu   =   a  +  b NAVu                   ...     ...   (7) 
 
  The  estimated  value  of  b  turned  out  to  be  statistically 
indistinguishable  from  0  (t-value  of  0.35),  and  the  value  of  R2 
turned  out  to  be  0.001,  implying  that  the  two  variables  did  not 
have the expected linear relationship.  
 
  This result is counter to what one would expect in a market 
dominated by rational investors, and suggests that the market may 
indeed be governed by irrational considerations.  Price movements 
divorced from fundamentals could be the reason for the much higher 
volatility  and  beta  of  the  market  prices  of  Mastershares  as 
compared to the NAV. 
 
  These  results  seem  to  be  in  line  with  some  of  the  current 
work being done on irrationalities in the market. These researches 
[9,10,11], which are reviewed along with other work in [12], point 
out  that  many  a  time  market  seems  to  add  to  the  variability  of 
returns on a scrip without any basis in the fundamentals of that 
scrip.   
   
 
Conclusion 
   
  The  Mastershares  in  terms  of  NAV  have  out-performed  the 
market and the assertions made by the executives of the Trust at 
the time of establishing the Fund stands vindicated. However, how 
the  superior  performance  has  been  achieved  is  a  mystery,  defying 
an  explanation  through  statistical  analysis.  A  possible 
explanation could lie in the policy of the Trust on allocation of 
shares  acquired  from  the  primary  market  (at  prices  well  below 
prevailing  market  prices)  to  different  schemes.  Verification  of 
such conjectures is impossible from secondary data.  
 
  The  performance  of  Mastershares  based  on  Market  Prices  is 
mixed.  The  explanation  for  this  possibly  lies  in  the  irrational 
inflation  of  volatility  of  prices  over  the  volatility  of  the 
fundamental  value,  the  NAV.  We  concluded  that  the  market  is 
inefficient  in  this  regard  and  is  no  different  from  the  more 
developed  capital  markets  where  a  similar  phenomenon  has  been 
observed. 
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